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entity, economic injury generally occurs in its principal place of business.5 This element may
prove challenging for foreign plaintiffs with a principal place of business overseas. The first
issue is whether a foreign creditor would be precluded from recovering a debtor’s assets when
the debtor engages in racketeering and fraud in the transfer of assets that were or would have
otherwise been part of the bankruptcy estate. If so, the second issue is whether a similar
presumption against extraterritoriality of the United States Bankruptcy Code, codified under
title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”) can be overcome in a case involving
a foreign defendant.
Part I of this memorandum explores how a presumption against extraterritoriality under
the civil RICO statute prevents most foreign plaintiffs from recovering a debtor’s illegally
transferred assets. Part II examines how a debtor or trustee may recover a claim against a
foreign defendant relating to the avoidance of preferential transfers under section 547 of the
Bankruptcy Code, despite a similar presumption against extraterritoriality.
I.

Foreign Plaintiffs May Fail to Recover a Debtor’s Assets because section
1964(c) Does Not Apply Extraterritorially
The congressional purpose of enacting RICO was to “eradicate criminal racketeering.”6

Because congressional intent was focused on criminal activity, only the criminal portion of the
RICO statute, section 1962, was found to apply to foreign activity “to the extent that the
predicates alleged in a particular case themselves apply extraterritorially.”7 This finding reflects
how “[a]bsent clearly expressed congressional intent to the contrary, federal laws will be
construed to have only domestic application.”8

5

See Armada (Sing.) Pte Ltd., 244 F. Supp. 3d at 755.
See Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1019 (7th Cir. 1992).
7
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106.
8
Id. at 2093 (citing Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)).
6
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Accordingly, a plaintiff can only state a claim under section 1964(c) if a “domestic
injury” is alleged and proven.9 Economic injury would only be actionable if the plaintiff’s
principal place of business was located within the United States.10 Therefore, most foreign
plaintiffs with a principal place of business in foreign jurisdictions fail to recover in a civil
RICO claim.
A. The Domestic Injury Requirement Under a Civil RICO Claim Requires More Than
the Mere Use of Domestic Bank Accounts
The purpose of the domestic injury requirement in a civil RICO claim is to avoid
“unjustifiably permit[ing]” foreign plaintiffs from bypassing their own country’s “less
generous remedial schemes.”11 In general, a plaintiff must allege and prove that the injury to
its business or property was felt in the United States.12 Each injury should be analyzed
separately to examine whether each was a domestic or foreign injury.13 Moreover, the plaintiff
must show that the injured property or its injured principal place of business is located in the
United States because mere contact with the U.S. at the time of injury does not “suffice[] to
make an injury domestic.”14
The fact that a property or even a business located outside of the United States was
injured by a defendant’s use of the American banking system does not “transform an otherwise
foreign injury into a domestic one” for the purposes of a civil RICO claim.15 In one of the most
cited cases, the Bascuñán court found two injuries involving the illegal transfer of foreign funds

9

RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2111.
Armada (Sing.) Pte Ltd., 244 F. Supp. 3d at 755.
11
RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2106-07.
12
Id. at 2111.
13
See Bascuñán v. Elsaca, 874 F.3d 806, 814 (2d Cir. 2017).
14
Id. at 810.
15
Bascuñán, 874 F.3d at 810.
10
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into or through United States bank accounts to be insufficient to amount to a domestic injury.16
However, the court held the injury to a foreign plaintiff’s property located within the United
States at the time it was harmed or stolen to be a domestic injury.17 The court reasoned this
holding was consistent with the Supreme Court’s concern for avoiding “international friction”
in implementing the domestic injury requirement because “[f]oreign persons and entities that
own private property located within the United States expect that our laws will protect them in
the event of damage to that property.”18
B. Economic Injury Occurs in a Corporate Entity’s Principal Place of Business
If the economic injury is to a foreign plaintiff’s business, that corporate entity
“generally suffers economic harm in its principal place of business.”19 It is generally
insufficient to show that a foreign entity’s economic injuries were caused by the defendant’s
actions conducted within the United States.20 Economic injury to a foreign entity occurs in its
principal place of business regardless of whether its funds were “tied up” in the United States.21
In a recent chapter 15 bankruptcy case, foreign-plaintiff Armada (Singapore) Pte Ltd.
(“Armada”) was precluded from recovering a debtor’s illegally transferred assets in a civil
RICO claim.22 After debtor-Ashapura filed for bankruptcy in the Southern District of New York
in October 2011, Armada, a creditor, received two default judgments from an arbitration
decision in the United Kingdom in the amount of seventy million dollars against Ashapura, and
16

Id. at 818.
Id. at 820-21 (recognizing a plaintiff’s place of residence may often be dispositive in other
cases involving injury to a business).
18
Id. at 821.
19
Armada (Sing.) Pte Ltd., 244 F. Supp.3d at 755.
20
Id. See RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2101 (emphasizing that if “the conduct relevant to the
statute’s focus occurred in a foreign country, then the case involves an impermissible
extraterritorial application regardless of any other conduct that occurred in U.S. territory.”).
21
Exeed Industries, LLC v. Younis, 15 C 14, 2016 WL 6599949, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 8, 2016).
22
Armada (Sing.) Pte Ltd., 244 F. Supp. 3d at 750.
17
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filed an adversary proceeding against Amcol and its affiliates.23 Armada claimed the defendants
violated the criminal portion of the RICO statute by engaging in racketeering through numerous
acts of mail and wire fraud in an attempt to transfer debtor-Ashapura’s assets abroad.24
According to Armada, the defendants misled the bankruptcy court in failing to disclose and by
illegally transferring sixty million dollars of Ashapura’s assets to a foreign affiliate.25 Because
Armada alleged an economic injury to its business, the court held it failed to allege a domestic
injury because its principal place of business was in Singapore.26
The rule that a foreign business feels its economic injury in its principal place of
business for purposes of a civil RICO claim may result in foreign plaintiffs failing to recover
a debtor’s illegally transferred assets, unlike domestic creditors similarly situated.27 Also, the
holding that the defendant’s tortious actions within the United States is insufficient to
establish a domestic economy injury denies additional foreign plaintiffs recovery.
II.

A Focus on the Initial Transfer as Opposed to the Injury May Permit Plaintiffs
to Overcome a Presumption Against Extraterritorial Application of the
Bankruptcy Code
Like the civil RICO statute, there is a presumption against extraterritoriality in the

application of the Bankruptcy Code absent explicit congressional intent to the contrary.28 In

23

Id. at 752-54.
Id. at 753-54.
25
Id.
26
Id. at 755. See, e.g., Kamel v. Hill–Rom Co., 108 F.3d 799, 805 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding the
plaintiff suffered economic injury in Saudi Arabia and not in the United States because its
principal place of business was in Saudi Arabia).
27
See, e.g., RJR Nabisco, 136 S. Ct. at 2115-16 (Justice Ginsburg stressing in her dissenting
opinion that defendants “commercially engaged here and abroad would be answerable civilly to
U.S. victims of their criminal activities, but foreign parties similarly injured would have no
RICO remedy.”).
28
In re Maxwell Commun. Corp. PLC, 186 B.R. 807, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d sub nom., 93
F.3d 1036, 1051-52 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that England had “a stronger interest than the United
States in applying its own avoidance law” to the preferential transfers and that the presumption
24
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determining whether this presumption against extraterritoriality applies, a court must first
determine the “focus of the statute.”29 Then, a court must determine “whether the activity that
is the focus of the statute had taken place in the United States or overseas.”30
Unlike the focus of injury to property in the civil RICO statute, the focus of section 547
of the Bankruptcy Code is the initial transfer that depleted the property that would have
otherwise become part of the bankruptcy estate.31 While the use of U.S. banks for transfers is
insufficient to establish a domestic injury for a civil RICO claim, it may be sufficient to
overcome a presumption against extraterritoriality in a claim relating to the avoidance of
preferential transfers.32 The creditors’ committee in In re Arcapita Bank brought an adversary
proceeding against foreign defendants to avoid preferential transfers of U.S. dollars that were
made through correspondent bank accounts in New York.33 The court stated the Bascuñán
court’s holding that the mere use of U.S. banks was insufficient to establish a domestic injury
was inapplicable to a case involving the avoidance of preferential transfers using U.S. banks
because the focus of section 547 is on the initial transfer and not on the injury.34 The Arcapita
court held that the creditor’s committee overcame the presumption against extraterritoriality
because it demonstrated that the initial transfer of property occurred in the United States
through the foreign defendants’ use of correspondent bank accounts in New York.35

against extraterritoriality was not overcome by minor domestic effects in the reduction of the
debtor’s assets pooled in the U.S. for English creditors).
29
Arcapita Bank B.S.C. (c) v. Bahrain Islamic Bank B.S.C. (c) (In re Arcapita Bank B.S.C. (c)),
12-11076 (SHL), 2018 WL 718399, at *2 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2018) (citing generally
Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247 (2010)).
30
Id.
31
In re Arcapita Bank, 2018 WL 718399, at *2.
32
Id.
33
Id. at *1.
34
Id. at *2.
35
Id.
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If the transfer at issue is primarily foreign, the plaintiff cannot overcome the
presumption against extraterritoriality.36 The trustee in In re CIL Ltd. brought an adversary
proceeding against foreign defendants to avoid equity transfers.37 The court reasoned these
equity transfer interests in a United Kingdom entity to be primarily foreign because the stocks
were issued using a Cayman Islands company instead of U.S. banks.38 Because the transfer was
made outside of the United States, the court held the presumption against extraterritoriality
applied.39
Conclusion
The denial of a foreign plaintiff’s recovery of a debtor’s assets under a civil RICO claim
stems from the domestic injury requirement and a presumption against extraterritorial
application of 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c). Under this rule, a foreign plaintiff may be precluded from
recovery because the illegal transfer of a debtor’s assets results in an economic injury to the
foreign entity’s business. Because this injury is felt in the entity’s principal place of business, a
successful civil RICO claim is highly improbable, if not impossible, for a foreign plaintiff
whose principal place of business is usually located overseas. A foreign plaintiff would also fail
to recover where the fraudulent transfers occurred using U.S. banks because the focus of the
civil RICO statute is on the injury as opposed to on the transfer itself.
There is a more promising chance of recovery against a foreign defendant under section
547 of the Bankruptcy Code because the focus of that statute is on the location where the
transfer of the assets occurs rather than on the location where the injury is felt. Accordingly, a
debtor or trustee may successfully allege a claim against a foreign creditor under section 547 if
36

In re CIL Ltd., 582 B.R. 46, 95-96 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018).
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
37
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the transfers were domestic in origin through the use of U.S. banks.
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